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ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the right and a potential duty of directors to 
pursue CSR policies under German law. It first explains the two main 
duties of directors: to make sure that the company complies with its legal 
obligations, which has been broadly interpreted in Germany to include the 
duty to extend to domestic and foreign subsidiaries’ compliance with the 
law, and to act for  the (economic) benefit of the company. CSR policies 
will often only come under the second duty, which means that they can be 
pursued if they are economically beneficial. However, acting in order to  
benefit the company also means the avoidance of unnecessary risk, 
including the risk of tort law liability.   This article discusses how recent 
tort law development towards a duty of care of parent companies for 
employees of their subsidiaries, and perhaps even victims of their 
subsidiaries’ operations, as triggered by the English landmark case of 
Chandler v Cape, has created risks for parent companies that affect the duty 
of their directors to establish a corporation-wide system of prevention. It 
is argued that those liability risks are substantive in amount but uncertain 
due to the early state of case law, with a number of relevant cases pending 
at this moment; which allows directors a certain margin of appreciation. 
The article concludes that the tort law development has certainly 
strengthened the right of directors to pursue a CSR policy that avoids 
liability, while a corresponding duty of directors may arise and intensify 
with the influx of more transnational tort law cases and, in particular, with 
judgments in favour of victims of torts committed in the course of 
operations of transnational corporations in developing countries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The discussion on directors’ duties and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) has come a long way. At the outset, it centred around 
the question of whether or not the directors of a company were allowed 
to pursue CSR although this might be less profitable than ruthless (but 
lawful) behaviour. In the meantime, the tone has shifted towards a 
potential duty of directors to pursue CSR goals. In this article, several 
developments in German law (and beyond) shall be discussed, which 
together may have changed, or have the potential to change, the picture: 
case law relating to directors’ duties under the legality principle, in 
particular in the context of transnational corporations with subsidiaries in 
developing countries, and developments in tort law that may have an 
impact on the duty to avoid unnecessary risks for  the benefit of the 
company. Combined, they have the potential not only to justify the 
pursuance of CSR but they may even pave the way towards a duty to 
include at least aspects of CSR into the policy and operations of the 
corporation. 
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1.1. TWO STRANDS OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 
Directors’ duties are duties that are owed to the company, not to 
third parties. Thus, a breach of directors’ duties does not normally lead to 
external liability but to a claim of the company against the director. That 
claim must, of course, be based on the damage that the company suffered 
from the breach, and that damage may consist  of liability towards victims 
of a tort. It could, however, also be damage that consists in fines for 
unlawful behaviour. 
Directors’ duties are legally defined for the public limited company 
(Aktiengesellschaft). Under § 93 para. 1 Aktiengesetz (AktG), in conducting 
business, the members of the management board shall employ the care of 
a diligent and conscientious manager. They shall not be deemed to have 
violated the aforementioned duty if, at the time of taking the 
entrepreneurial decision, they had good reason to assume that they were 
acting on the basis of adequate information for the benefit of the 
company. 
In the following, the article deals with two types of directors’ duties: 
the legality principle and the duty to act for  the benefit of the company. 
1.2. THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE 
Regardless of the potential economic benefit of unlawful behaviour, 
directors always have the duty to comply with legal obligations.1 This 
would, of course, include legal obligations relating to corporate social 
responsibility. For example, bribery would be a breach of directors’ duties 
even if the bribe in question secures beneficial business.2 The legality 
principle has seen significant development in recent years that  is of great 
relevance in the context of transnational corporations. 
1.2.1. CONTROL OF SUBSIDIARIES 
The legality principle has two elements: First, the directors 
themselves are required to act in accordance with the law, and second, 
they have to ensure compliance with the law by their subordinates; which 
triggers the question of whether the directors and staff of subsidiaries are 
subordinated to the directors of the parent company.3 In principle, the 
                                                            
1 See German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof; hereinafter: BGH) NJW 2010, 
3458, 3460. See also Dirk A Verse, ‘Compliance im Konzern’ [2011] Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 401, 405. 
2 See LG Munich I, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2014, 345, 346; Eike Bicker, 
‘Compliance – organisatorische Umsetzung im Konzern’ [2012] Die Aktiengesellschaft 
542; Gerald Spindler, ‘§ 93’ in Wulf Goette, Mathias Habersack and Susanne Kalss (eds), 
Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 4th ed (CH Beck 2014) margin notes 91ff. For an 
outdated view in a slightly different context see BGH NJW 1985, 2405. 
3 On the related controversial discussion see Uwe H Schneider and Sven H Schneider, 
‘Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der Konzernleitung’ [2007] Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2061 vs. Verse, supra note 1, at 411ff. 
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majority of authors agree with such a corporation-wide coverage of the 
directors’ duties and argue that the directors of the parent company are 
required to establish a corporation-wide compliance system; whereas the 
details of such a system may differ from one corporation to the next and 
be subject to some discretion. This is despite the recognition of the legal 
separation of the parent company and its subsidiaries, and the reason for 
the duty to establish a corporation-wide compliance system may also be 
seen in the risk that a breach of law by the subsidiary may affect the assets 
of the parent company.4 Moreover, one may refer to the voluntary 
German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex),5 which presents essential statutory regulations for the management 
and supervision of German listed companies and contains, in the form of 
recommendations and suggestions, internationally and nationally 
acknowledged standards for good and responsible corporate governance, 
formulated under the heading ‘Management Board’: ‘The Management 
Board ensures that all provisions of law and the enterprise’s internal 
policies are abided by and works to achieve their compliance by group 
companies (compliance).’6 
1.2.2. THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION 
Arguably, the duty to establish a corporation-wide compliance 
system extends to foreign subsidiaries. This was confirmed in the 
Neubürger decision of the Landgericht Munich I.7 Mr Neubürger was the 
financial director of Siemens AG, the parent company of innumerable 
subsidiaries worldwide. During his term of service, a corporation-wide 
system of corruption existed, in the context of which a Nigerian subsidiary 
of Siemens AG won government contracts through bribery. The discovery 
of that system led not only to an immense loss of reputation but also to 
fines imposed on Siemens AG by the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Moreover, Siemens AG paid an estimated 
€474 million to the law firm they had commissioned to investigate the 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, ‘Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen 
Unternehmensverbund’ [2008] Corporate Compliance Zeitschrift 1, 6. See also Verse, 
supra note 1, at 407ff., who however argues that the duty to ensure compliance with the 
law of subsidiaries does not stem from the legality principle but from the duty to act to 
the benefit of the company; which would mean that the directors could decide to let the 
subsidiary engage in unlawful activities if they are to the benefit of the company; ibid., 
411ff. 
5 The German Corporate Governance Code is referred to in § 161 AktG. It follows the 
principle of comply or explain. Thus, listed corporations do not have to follow the 
recommendations and suggestions but they have to lay open if they do not do so and 
explain why they choose not to adhere to particular recommendations and suggestions. 
6 GermanCorporateGovernanceCode,2005, <www.dcgk.de//files/dcgk/usercontent 
/en/download/code/2015-05- 05_Corporate_Governance_Code_EN.pdf, principleG 
4.1.3.> accessed 1 September 2017. 
7 LG Munich I, supra note 2. 
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details of the corruption system. Of that amount, Siemens AG reclaimed 
a part of €15 million from Mr Neubürger, arguing that he breached his 
duties under § 93 para. 2 AktG, thereby causing damage to Siemens AG, 
and Siemens AG succeeded in the Landgericht Munich I.  
The court argued that the directors' duties include the establishment 
of a supervision system by which breaches of the law are prevented. The 
details of that requirement depend on the type and size of the enterprise, 
the relevant legal provisions, the geographical situation and previous 
suspicious situations. In the instant case, the court held that the directors, 
amongst them Mr Neubürger, had not taken any measures to improve the 
compliance management system of Siemens AG despite repeated hints 
towards its lack of effectiveness, and the lacking reliability of the regional 
compliance officer but rather covered the responsible members of staff 
and misled the supervisory board. 
The decision was the subject of a controversial debate in academic 
literature.8 Mr Neubürger appealed but reached an out-of-court settlement 
with Siemens before the trial started (and committed suicide shortly after). 
Thus, the decision was never overruled, and it would not be wise for a 
director to ignore it. 
1.2.3. THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE 
As mentioned above, a breach of the directors’ duties does not give 
rise to damage claims by external victims9 but only by the company itself, 
which means that they will only influence the behaviour of directors if 
there is a risk that the company will enforce the claim. The relevant body 
is the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Here, another landmark decision has 
increased that risk drastically. In the case of ARAG v Garmenbeck, the BGH 
decided that the members of the supervisory board who do not bring such 
a claim on behalf of the company incur liability for breach of their own 
duties.10 That decision has changed the picture in that claims against 
directors have been brought more frequently ever since.11 For example, 
the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG is currently considering to sue 
                                                            
8 For critique, see Gregor Bachmann, ‘Anmerkung zum Urteil des LG München I vom 
10.12.2013 - 5 HK o 1387/10 - Zur Haftung des Vorstands für Mängel des Compliance-
Systems’ [2014] Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 579; Walter G Paefgen, ‘"Compliance" 
als gesellschaftsrechtliche Organpflicht?’ [2016] Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 433. 
9 In particular, § 93 AktG is not a statute whose breach would give rise to the tort of 
breach of a statutory duty under § 823 para. 2 BGB, see, e.g., Spindler, supra note 2, 
margin note 309. 
10 BGH, NJW 1997, 1926. 
11 See Tim Drygala, Marko Staake and Stephan Szalai, Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht (Springer 
2012) § 21 margin note 97. In academic writing, in contrast, there seems to be a trend to 
weaken the meaning of ARAG v Garmenbeck and to allow the supervisory board some 
discretion. For an overview of the debate see Jens Koch, ‘Die schleichende Erosion der 
Verfolgungspflicht nach ARAG/Garmenbeck’ [2014] Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht 934. 
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the directors of Volkswagen AG and Audi for at least negligent omission 
to prevent ‘Dieselgate’.12 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that coverage of directors' and 
officers' (D&O) insurance has been restricted in 2009. Under § 93 para. 2 
sent. 3 AktG, insurance contracts must provide for a director’s 
contribution of at least 10% of the damage up to at least 1.5 times the fix 
annual salary. This was explicitly meant to create incentives for directors 
to act responsibly.13 
1.2.4. THE EXTENT OF AND LIMITATIONS TO THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE 
(a) Statutory obligations 
Liability under the legality principle requires a breach of law, which 
in transnational situations may often mean the breach of the law of the 
host state of the subsidiary.14 Thus, the legality requires the directors of 
parent companies to ensure compliance with local laws; which, often do 
not require ‘socially responsible’ behaviour. It should, however, be noted 
that some of the ‘classical’ CSR issues, such as the lack of a working fire 
protection system, as in the case of the Ali Enterprises factory fire,15 are 
in breach of local laws. Moreover, a number of developing countries avail 
of modern environmental laws16 (which are, however, often not enforced). 
In contrast, there is little doubt that soft law, and even international 
soft law, does not count as ‘law’ in this sense but would rather be classified 
as an emanation of ‘good morals’; and clearly, there is no obligation under 
German company law to comply with good morals.17 Thus, there is no 
duty to comply with CSR instruments such as the OECD Guidelines,18 
the Global Compact19 or the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework'20 
                                                            
12 See Kristina Gnirke, ‘Winterkorn und Stadler droht Millionenforderung’ (Spiegel online, 
4 April 2017) <www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/volkswagen-martin-winter 
korn-und-rupert-stadler-droht-millionenforderung-a-1141287.html> accessed 14 June 
2017. 
13 See the report of the legal committee (Bericht des Rechtsausschusses), Printed Matters of the 
German Bundestag (Bundestags-Drucksache) 16/13433, 11 
14 See also Michael Kort, ‘Gemeinwohlbelange beim Vorstandshandeln’ [2012] Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 926, 927. 
15 On which see infra, at 3.1.2. 
16 See, e.g., the case of Vedanta, infra at 3.1.1., that was concerned with the breach of 
Zambian environmental legislation; which caused harm to neighbouring communities. 
17 Kort, supra note 14, at 929; Wolfgang Hölters, ‘§ 93 AktG’ in Wolfgang Hölters (ed), 
Aktiengesetz, 2nd ed (CH Beck 2014), margin note 70. 
18 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations as first adopted in 1976, 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text> accessed 1 September 2017. 
19 “Homepage | UN Global Compact” (Homepage | UN Global Compact) 
<www.unglobalcompact.org> accessed August 15 2017.  
20 John Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
Rights’, (UN doc A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008) <www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-
report-7-Apr-2008.pdf> accessed 1 September 2017. 
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and the 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights'21 as such, that 
is, if they have not found entry into the law, for example, through open-
ended norms,22 or into the internal regulation of the corporation, in 
particular due to subscription to, for example, the Global Compact. 
(b) Internal regulation 
In the context of directors’ duties, the notion of ‘legal obligations’ 
goes beyond obligations stemming from statutory law. It also includes the 
internal regulation of the corporation, thus the ‘law of the company’.23 The 
directors are bound by the by-laws as far as the subject of the enterprise 
and the aims and objectives of the corporation are concerned. This may 
of course include the aim to be a social and environmentally friendly 
corporation, which may be expressed in the adoption or signature of soft 
law instruments, such as codes of conduct. Thus, compliance with codes 
of conduct to which the corporation has signed up would seem to come 
within the scope of the legality principle. The same applies to compliance 
with internal guidelines that have been adopted or consented to by the 
competent bodies of the corporation, as compliance with such regulation 
is in the interest of the corporation. In contrast, the directors would not 
be forced, under the legality principle, to enforce guidelines that they have 
set up themselves but which have not become part of the internal 
regulation of the corporation. Again, breach of internal regulation will only 
be actionable if it caused damage to the corporation. 
1.2.5. SUMMING UP 
The legality principle is able to cover CSR issues that are expressed 
in legal obligations, including those established in the host states of 
subsidiaries. In contrast, it has no significance for any duty or right of 
directors to pursue CSR policies beyond the law, including the internal 
regulation of the company. 
1.3. THE BENEFIT OF THE COMPANY 
Where there is no legal obligation, the directors have the duty to act 
for the benefit of the company. Here, they enjoy the discretion that is 
                                                            
21 John Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, (UN doc 
A/HRC/17/31,31March2011) 
<www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf> accessed 1 
September 2017. 
22 On which, see Carola Glinski, ‘The Ruggie Principles, business human rights self-
regulation and tort law: Increasing standards through mutual impact and learning’ (2017) 
15 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 15, concerning the relationship between the Ruggie 
Framework and Guiding Principles, tort law and transnational private regulation, with 
further references. 
23 See Holger Fleischer, ‘§ 93 AktG’, in Gerald Spindler and Eberhard Stilz (eds), 
Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 3rd ed (CH Beck 2015) margin notes 21f. 
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commonly referred to as the business judgment rule. Actually, the second 
sentence of § 93 para. 1 AktG, according to which the directors shall not 
be deemed to have violated the aforementioned duty if, at the time of 
taking the entrepreneurial decision, they had good reason to assume that 
they were acting on the basis of adequate information for the benefit of 
the company, has not always formed part of German law. It was 
introduced in 2005 in the aftermath of the above-mentioned ARAG 
decision of the BGH24 in order to clarify that directors are not liable for 
the lack of success of the company but only for imprudent decisions in 
breach of the business judgment rule.25 The business judgment rule was 
meant to be a codification of the ARAG decision. Although it was only 
explicitly codified in the law on public limited companies, the same 
principles apply for private limited companies under § 43 Gesetz betreffend 
die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG) and other companies, as 
the legislator has mentioned expressly in the explanations on the draft 
legislation.26 
CSR strategies will often have the potential benefit the company, an 
issue that is commonly discussed as the ‘business case of CSR’.27 Key 
words are market advantages through advertising with CSR, employees’ 
satisfaction leading to reduced fluctuation, good relationship with 
government and the avoidance of scandals that might lead to loss of 
reputation or consumer boycotts.28 The latter aspect is currently gaining 
momentum through the CSR Reporting Directive 2014/95/EC,29 which 
will force big corporations to lay open their CSR policies.30 
In connection with the business judgment rule, such potential 
advantages of socially responsible behaviour may often justify a CSR 
policy;31 although this is not necessarily the case, for example, where there 
are no end-users involved, as in the extraction industry, or where end-
users are insensitive to the well-being of people in the host states of the 
                                                            
24 And a follow-on decision in the case of Siemens AG v Nold, BGH NJW 1997, 2599. 
25 See Spindler, supra note 2, margin note 8. 
26 See Printed Matters of the German Bundestag 15/5092, 12. See, e.g., BGH NJW 2010, 3458. 
27 On which see, e.g., Dennis J Aigner, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance’ in Ronny Manos and Israel Drori (eds), Corporate Responsibility (Palgrave & 
Macmillan 2016) 11. 
28 Examples for financial loss resulting from scandals are Nike and Shell (in the context 
of the oil platform Brent Spar), see, e.g., Menno T Kamminga, ‘Company Reponses to 
Human Rights Reports: An Empirical Analysis’ [2016] Business and Human Rights 
Journal 95, 101. 
29 Directive 2014/95/EU amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-
financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ 2014 L 
330/1. 
30 See, e.g., Peter Hommelhoff, ‘Nichtfinanzielle Ziele in Unternehmen von öffentlichem 
Interesse’ in Reinhard Bork, Godehard Kayser and Frank Kebekus (eds), Festschrift für 
Bruno M. Kübler zum 70. Geburtstag (CH Beck 2015) 291. 
31 See, eg, Hölters, supra note 17, margin note 70. 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND CSR UNDER GERMAN LAW 18 
production.32 If there is no possible benefit, most authors would deny the 
directors’ right to pursue a CSR policy.33 
Certainly, it would be difficult to argue in favour of a duty to act 
socially responsibly  for the benefit of the company (given the undeniable 
costs of CSR), unless in the individual case, it is obvious that pursuing a 
CSR strategy – to what extent? – will be more beneficial to the corporation 
than not caring about CSR. 
Another aspect of the duty to act for the benefit of the company is 
the duty to avoid unnecessary risks, including the unnecessary liability to 
third parties.34 The duty to avoid unnecessary liability risks requires 
consideration of the extension of the risk and the likelihood of its 
materialisation.35 Thus, special care is required where a business decision 
puts the whole enterprise at risk.36 
2. CHANGES THROUGH TORT LAW LITIGATION? 
Tort law litigation against transnational corporations and even 
against the dominant purchaser in a supply chain is the topic of the day, 
and corporations from, for example, the oil business and the extracting 
industry are facing litigation by victims of human rights abuses and 
environmental degradation in several jurisdictions; which may lead to high 
damage payments that affect the success of the corporation. Thus, in the 
following, the recent development in tort litigation is analysed and put into 
context with the directors’ duty to avoid unnecessary risk. It should be 
mentioned that liability risks may also stem from other areas of law, for 
example from securities law or from unfair commercial practices law, 
where a corporation does not keep its CSR promises. These are, however, 
not subjects of this article. 
2.1. NOVELTIES IN TORT LITIGATION 
2.1.1. TORT LAW LIABILITY IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES 
Tort law litigation related to – broadly speaking - the parent 
company’s liability for damage suffered by employees and neighbours of 
                                                            
32 On loss of reputation that may or may not lead to financial loss, see Lars Klöhn and 
Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, ‘Unternehmensreputation (Corporate Reputation)’ [2015] Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 689. 
33 See, eg, Kort, supra note 14, at 929. For a deviating position, see Olaf Müller-Michaels 
and Wiebke Ringel, ‘Muss sich Ethik lohnen?’ [2011] Die Aktiengesellschaft 101. 
34 See, eg, Spindler, supra note 2, margin note 67; OLG Jena, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht 2001, 86 
35 Dirk Kocher, ‘Zur Reichweite der Business Judgment Rule’ [2009] Corporate 
Compliance Zeitschrift 215, 217. On the criterion of likelihood, see OLG Jena, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2001, 86; Egon Kust, ‘Zur Sorgfaltspflicht und 
Verantwortlichkeit eines ordentlichen und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters’ [1980] 
Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 758, 761. 
36 See Spindler, supra note 2, margin notes 54f. 
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subsidiaries in developing countries has been discussed in academic 
writing for a long time37 but has been fuelled by the English landmark case 
of Chandler v Cape;38 although, ironically, the case was purely domestic as 
both the parent company and the subsidiary were domiciled in England. 
Nevertheless, the case was seen as a breakthrough in imposing liability on 
parent companies for problems that occurred in the realm of the 
subsidiary, and academics as well as practitioners immediately made the 
link to the classical problems of corporate liability for disasters in 
developing countries. 
The case concerned an English worker, Mr. Chandler, who during 
work for Cape Products over a longer period of time was exposed to 
asbestos dust. Cape Products was a wholly owned subsidiary of Cape plc. 
Both companies were situated in the UK. Cape plc had control over the 
asbestos business carried out by the subsidiary in the sense that the 
products were manufactured in accordance with Cape’s product 
specifications. The separate administration of Cape Products was 
originally approved of by Cape plc on the condition that Cape products 
would be run ‘in accordance with company policy’. Cape plc had a group 
medical advisor employed, who was responsible for the health and welfare 
of all employees within the corporation (a ‘flying’ doctor) and also a 
scientific officer who was responsible for trying to find methods to 
suppress asbestos dust. Cape plc knew that the system of work at Cape 
products was defective. When Mr. Chandler became ill, Cape Products no 
longer existed. Consequently, Mr. Chandler sued the parent company, 
Cape plc, instead. 
The court found Cape plc liable towards Mr. Chandler under the tort 
of negligence, relying on a wide interpretation of the concept of 
‘assumption of responsibility’. Summarising the judgment, Arden LJ 
stated: 
‘in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company 
responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees. …  
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; 
(2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of 
health and safety in the particular industry;  
                                                            
37 See, eg, Halina Ward, ‘Towards a New Convention on Corporate Accountability? Some 
Lessons from the Thor Chemicals and Cape PLC Cases’ [2001] Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 105; Carola Glinski, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der privaten 
Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards (Nomos 2010) 332ff; ead., ‘Corporate Self-
Regulation: Moral or Legal Obligation?’ in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and 
Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 119. 
38 [2012] EWCA Civ 525. For detailed analysis, see Martin Petrin, ‘Assumption of 
Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc’ (2013) 76 MLR 589, 603ff.; Siel 
Demeyere, ‘Liability of a Mother Company for its Subsidiary in French, Belgian, and 
English Law’ [2015] European Review of Private Law 385, 402ff. 
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(3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to 
have known; and 
(4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would 
rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection. 
For the purposes of (4) it is not necessary to show that the parent is in the practice 
of intervening in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary. The court will look at 
the relationship between the companies more widely. The court may find that element 
(4) is established where the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations 
of the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.’39 
In the aftermath of Chandler v Cape, courts in England but also in the 
Netherlands have seen an influx of cases relating to transnational 
corporations and their operations in developing countries. Royal Dutch 
Shell is facing litigation regarding the operations of its Nigerian subsidiary 
SPDC in the Netherlands40 as well as in England.41 The English company 
Vedanta is being sued in England, together with its Zambian subsidiary 
KCM, in relation to environmental damage caused by the copper mine 
that is operated by KCM.42 Germany has not seen a transnational case 
dealing with human rights violations of corporations in recent years,43 
although in a recent empirical study, German corporations ranked number 
5 among the countries whose companies most frequently received reports 
on human rights infringements abroad, after US American, British, 
Canadian and Chinese corporations.44 
All these cases are still pending at the time of writing, at different 
stages, and a variety of issues, or barriers to the claims of victims, are 
subjects of controversial debates, amongst them prominently jurisdiction, 
the applicable law, and most crucially, substantive law. 
Jurisdiction of EU Member States’ courts for claims against parent 
companies that are domiciled in the relevant Member State is not normally 
a problem any longer, as under Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation 
                                                            
39 Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 [80]. 
40 See, eg, District Court of the Hague, 30/1/2013, Fidelis Ayoro Oguru et al. v Royal Dutch 
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41 See Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC). 
42 See Lungowe and others v (1) Vedanta Resources plc (2) Konkola Copper Mines plc [2016] 
EWHC 292 (TCC). 
43 See Miriam Saage-Maaß and Maren Leifker, ‘Haftungsrisiken deutscher Unternehmen 
und ihres Managements für Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Ausland’ [2015] Betriebs-
Berater 2499, 2501. 
44 See Kamminga, supra note 28, at 101 f. 
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(EU) No. 1215/2012,45 defendants can be sued in the courts of the 
Member States where they are domiciled. In the case of Owusu,46 the 
Anglo-Saxon doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which courts had been 
allowed to deny and had denied jurisdiction for reasons such as the 
impracticality of collecting evidence, political economy,47 or even the 
workload of courts,48 was rejected by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
as being non-compliant with the provisions of EU law, namely, the 
Brussels I Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001,49 the predecessor of Regulation 
(EU) No. 1215/2012. English courts have accepted that decision ever 
since,50 and current controversies concerning jurisdiction do not relate to 
the parent company but to the question whether or not the foreign 
subsidiary, who is not domiciled in an EU Member State, can nevertheless 
be sued together with the parent company, due to the connection between 
the claims, although the EU Member States’ courts would clearly not have 
jurisdiction for these claims as, even in a multinational corporation, the 
individual legally independent companies have to be treated separately.51 
A connection of the claims has been accepted by the Dutch first instance 
court in Oguru v Shell,52 and by the English High Court in the Vedanta 
case,53 whereas it has been rejected in the Okpabi case where the first 
instance judge held that he saw no prospect of the claim against the parent 
company,54 which would be a necessary precondition for the connection 
with the claim against the subsidiary. 
The applicable law is to be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the Rome II Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007.55 Under Article 
4(1), the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur. In essence, this means that it is normally 
                                                            
45 OJ 2012 L 351/1. 
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49 OJ 2001 L 12/1. 
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the law of the developing country where the subsidiary operates and where 
the victims suffered damage that applies. In many instances, the tort law 
systems of these countries belong to the common law world; which 
triggers the interesting question of whether or not the recent development 
of English common law with the case of Chandler v Cape applies. In Oguru 
v Shell, the District Court of the Hague regarded Chandler v Cape plc to be a 
part of Nigerian law.56 English courts have been less bold until now, and 
in Vedanta as well as in Okpabi, the first instance judges heard experts from 
the relevant countries about their views of the application of Chandler v 
Cape in Zambian and Nigerian law respectively. Unsurprisingly, expert 
evidence supplied by the claimant and by the defendant differed, and the 
judges have not reached a conclusion yet on which opinion to follow.57 
Therefore, the following considerations first of all depend on the 
application of the Chandler v Cape criteria as part of the laws of the 
countries where the subsidiaries operate; which shall be assumed 
hereinafter. 
In substantive law, one important distinction relates to the claimants: 
In the Dutch Shell cases as well as in Vedanta and in Okpabi, the claimants 
are not employees of the subsidiaries, as in Chandler v Cape, but neighbours 
that have been harmed by the pollution of the environment through oil 
and mining operations. Until now, courts have not entirely excluded the 
application of Chandler v Cape to this type of claimants. The first instance 
judge in Vedanta said this: ‘For obvious reasons, such a claim is more likely 
to succeed if advanced by former employees .... However, depending on 
the facts, claims made by residents, rather than former employees, are still 
arguable.’58 
Another problem of fact is the comparability of the corporate 
structures at issue. As mentioned above, under the second Chandler v Cape 
criterion, the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some 
relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry. In contrast, 
in the case of Thompson v Renwick,59 liability of the parent company was 
denied because the parent company merely held shares in the subsidiary 
and did not possess superior knowledge in the field of business that the 
subsidiary was in. Thus, potential liability of the parent company heavily 
depends on the relationship between the parent company and the 
subsidiary. For example, the first instance judge in Okpabi argued that 
Royal Dutch Shell did not have any operations in Nigeria or anywhere; 
that it did not have any infrastructure in Nigeria; and that there was simply 
no evidence of a high level of oversight or high degree of control and 
direction, or indeed of any appreciable level of oversight or control either. 
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57 See Okpabi, supra note 41, [58] f.; Vedanta, supra note 42, [123]. 
58 See Vedanta, supra note 42, [115]. 
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Thus, he could not see the Chandler v Cape criteria satisfied.60 In contrast, 
the first instance judge in Vedanta saw a realistic chance to find that 
Vedanta has taken significant control over the operations of its subsidiary 
KCM.61 
Following Chandler v Cape, a scholarly debate has also started in 
Germany, where authors discuss a potential duty to organise the 
corporation including its subsidiaries in such a manner that employees and 
other third parties do not suffer harm. That debate is by and large 
fictitious, as far as activities of German parent companies in developing 
countries are concerned, as German law will not apply to torts that cause 
damage in the host states62 (although some authors try to bring German 
law to application, for example, as ‘rules of safety and conduct’ in the 
terms of Article 17 of the Rome II Regulation63 or through the ordre public 
rule of Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation, in particular if otherwise the 
law of an unjust state applied).64 A number of authors have argued towards 
an extension of the duty to organise the enterprise 
(Betriebsorganisationspflicht) to a duty to organise the corporation 
(Konzernorganisationspflicht).65 Generally speaking, German authors are 
cautious but recognise a general development towards greater 
responsibility for the activities of subsidiaries.66 
2.1.2. SUPPLY CHAIN LIABILITY 
The idea of supply chain liability is even more recent than the idea 
of the parent company’s liability for its impact on the performance of 
subsidiaries. It has also been fuelled by the case of Chandler v Cape. In fact, 
the court in Chandler v Cape did not refer in any way to ownership of the 
parent company in the subsidiary but rather to dependence and control. 
In the aftermath, academic authors have argued that a comparable 
‘relationship of control’, 'prior conduct that creates a situation of peril', 
'superior knowledge' and a situation in which the 'injured party relies on 
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the defendant' and his superior knowledge or resources may also exist in 
the relationship between suppliers and their purchasers.67 
Following spectacular disasters, in particular in the garment industry 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the first cases relating to supply chain 
responsibility have reached the courts. In Germany, four victims of the 
Ali Enterprises factory fire in Karachi have sued the garment discounter 
KiK, the main customer of Ali Enterprises, for damages.68 Outside EU 
jurisdictions, victims of the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh have 
initiated a class action in the US against several retailers,69 and a similar law 
suit has been filed in Ontario.70 
In terms of jurisdiction, no problems arise in EU Member States. In 
particular, victims would not normally try to sue the suppliers together 
with the purchasers as the suppliers lack relevant funds. In fact, if suppliers 
are large enough to be attractive defendants, the level of control of the 
purchaser over the supplier is likely to be insufficient to justify supply 
chain liability. 
The applicable law is again the law of the country where the damage 
occurred. Thus, in the German KiK case, the applicable law is the law of 
Pakistan;71 and therefore, again, Chandler v Cape may be relevant, as the LG 
Dortmund may find that case to be part of Pakistani law. In Rahaman, the 
Superior Court of Delaware applied Bangladeshi law to the issue of 
prescription but not to the employer’s liability claim.72 
In terms of substantive law, courts would need to be prepared to 
apply the Chandler v Cape criteria to supply chains, as proposed above. In 
Rahaman, the Superior Court of Delaware applied the general rules (of the 
law of Delaware) regarding an employer’s liability for the employees of an 
independent contractor without mentioning Chandler v Cape at all; which 
also the claimants apparently have not pleaded. The action was dismissed. 
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German scholars are also discussing supply chain liability under 
German tort law, and reluctance is even greater than with regard to 
organisational duties in corporate structures.73 
2.2. IMPACT ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES? 
As explained above, the duty to avoid unnecessary liability risks 
requires consideration of the extension of the risk and the likelihood of its 
materialisation. Looking at the degree of damage caused by subsidiaries in 
developing countries and the number of people affected, the extension of 
the risk is significant. For example, in Bodo Communities, the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria paid £55 million in 
settlement.74 In Okapbi and others v RDS and SPDC, the claimant chiefs of 
the Ogoni people represent around 42,000 people. The Vedanta law suit 
concerns 1,826 claimants. In the KiK case, four test claimants claim 
€30,000 each. Shortly after the admission of the claim and the grant of 
legal aid, KiK agreed to pay US-$5.15 Mio. to the victims.75 The Rana Plaza 
factory collapse, which was subject to the Rahaman litigation, claimed 
1,130 deaths and injured 2,500. In the Das case pending in Ontario $2 
billion are at stake.76 Law firms have sent messages to their transnational 
corporations clients warning them against the new liability risks.77 
The likelihood of the materialisation of the risk, in contrast, is 
difficult to estimate as all the law suits are still pending, and until now, 
almost no parent company has been successfully sued; in the case of Bodo 
Communities, it was the subsidiary SPDC who paid £55 million in 
settlement. Academic authors are also divided about the prospects of the 
claims as well as about the desirability of any duties of parent companies 
related to the activities of subsidiaries in developing countries. Thus, it is 
clearly not possible to argue that passivity on part of the parent company 
concerning the subsidiaries’ operations will lead to tort law liability, 
whereas it might lead to tort law liability. 
The same applies to supply chain liability where, intuitively, the idea 
of liability arising from supply chain control appears to be even more 
remote. Litigation is still at an early stage, and the best one can say at this 
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time is that the claims of subsidiaries’ employees have not been struck out 
immediately, and that legal aid has been granted in Germany; which means 
that the court does not deny the possibility of a successful claim 
(predominantly due to lack of knowledge of the law of Pakistan). 
Application of Chandler v Cape to supply chains has not been tested in the 
failed Rahaman litigation in Delaware. 
2.3. LIMITATIONS 
Tort law of course has its own limitations in that it usually requires 
physical damage, whereas liability for non-pecuniary damage is by and 
large excluded. Thus, tort law may impose liability on transnational 
corporations where insufficient health and safety precautions and 
environmental protection lead to physical damage and consequential loss 
of employees and neighbours, or where there is responsibility for human 
rights violations committed by security personnel in the neighbourhood. 
In contrast, it would seem impossible to catch other CSR issues such as, 
in particular, minimal wages, excessive working hours (unless they lead to 
health problems), or obstruction of workers’ associations. 
3. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
Of course, the law is not always clear. Legal uncertainty is a problem 
that arises both with regard to the duty to avoid unnecessary risks and with 
the legality principle. In principle, these situations need to be 
distinguished, as the appreciation of business risks, including liability risks, 
come under the business judgment rule whereas the legislator has made it 
clear that the business judgment rule does not apply to compliance with 
legal obligations under the legality principle. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued in academic writing that the criteria that are to be applied to the 
business judgment rule may also apply in situations of legal uncertainty, as 
in such situations, there will also be some margin of appreciation.78 
How do directors deal with this legal uncertainty? Clearly, directors 
will have to investigate the legal situation.79 This will normally require them 
to seek professional advice,80 in particular when it comes to the application 
of foreign law.81 Whether or not asking the internal legal department of 
the company suffices depends on the circumstances, such as the time that 
is available for the decision, but also the risk. Here, it should be recalled, 
that in CSR matters such as health and safety and environmental 
degradation the extension of the risk might be quite significant. The courts 
lean towards a duty to seek external advice,82 and even then, directors 
should be wary that in long-term relationship with an external, 
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independence may suffer over time.83 Quite obviously, the external 
professional must possess the relevant expertise,84 or his or her selection 
may trigger director’s liability.85 
If the director can derive from professional advice that the courts 
may interpret the law in favour of the company, he does not act in breach 
of his duty if he acts on the basis of such favourable interpretation.86 This 
would mean that in the current situation of legal uncertainty about a 
transnational corporation’s liability for damage that occurs in the country 
where the subsidiary or the supplier operates, the director would not be 
under the general duty to do everything to avoid that damage to occur; 
although it would seem that, again, the closer the situation to the Chandler 
v Cape criteria, and therefore, the greater the risk of liability, the more likely 
it is for a court to find a breach of duty. 
At the same time, there should be no doubt that the recently 
increased risk of liability in corporate structures and even in supply chain 
situations give directors the right to integrate risk avoidance measures in 
their decisions. Certainly, they have to follow the legal development, in 
particular the pending litigation, closely.87 
4. CONCLUSION 
Pursuing corporate social responsibility goals as such is surely not a 
duty of directors under German law. The directors’ duties under the 
legality principle only apply to existing legal obligations or to self-
commitments of a company, through its competent bodies, to CSR soft 
law or private regulation. Directors, however, also have to avoid 
unnecessary risks, under the business judgment rules. Here, the increasing 
risk of tort liability in the aftermath of Chandler v Cape, with the influx of 
cases in several jurisdictions, may lead to the duty but surely to the right 
of directors to organise the transnational corporation or the supply chain 
in such a way that damage is avoided, even if this is more costly than the 
often ruthless business policy of the past. 
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